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Summary 
Developed countries have pledged to increase financial assistance to poor countries in order to help them 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals. A few donors such as the US and the UK have been 
increasing their financial assistance in the recent past, but this trend has yet to be generalised across the 
donor community. Japan is among the largest aid donors, but has as yet not followed the US and the UK 
in increasing her aid budget. This paper sets the task of examining the prospects of Japanese aid to 
increase significantly in the coming years, and its allocation to be re-directed towards the most aid needy 
countries. To this end, we turn to the past to investigate how Japanese aid policies have changed over time 
and also identify empirically the major determinants of aid allocation. Our study shows that whilst Japan’s 
aid has increased in the past, in response to the broadening of its aid policy to include humanitarian and 
development objectives, the empirical analysis on aid allocation shows that geo-economic interests have 
played a crucial role. Given the historical trend one can conclude that the same determinant factors may 
keep on playing vital roles in aid allocation decision-making at least for some years to come, even though 
there has been an increased call for more assistance to poor regions. 
 
Keywords: ODA and poverty, Millennium Development Goals, Japanese ODA policy, determinants of 
Japanese aid allocation, cross-sectional analysis, donor interest, recipient need 
 
JEL classification: F35, C21, C23 
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1. Introduction 
Developed countries have pledged to increase financial assistance to poor countries in order to help them 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Assistance has been reaffirmed in various forums such as the 
Doha ministerial declaration of the WTO meeting in 2001 and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002 (UNDP 2003: 145).1 Economic self-interest and politico-strategic 
and humanitarian concerns motivate donors in their development assistance policies. More specifically, 
these include promotion of trade, direct foreign investments, image-building of the donor in the 
international arena, national security, as well as democracy and civil liberties in recipient countries. In 
addition, relationships derived from past colonial ties often influence aid flows positively (Alesina and 
Dollar 1998: 1; Todaro and Smith 2003: 653). An abundant amount of literature has pointed out that 
either economic self-interest or political self-interest has played a pivotal role in the early phases of foreign 
aid programmes of many donors. For instance, the United States used her aid programmes as strategic 
tools to halt the former Soviet Union in its tracks throughout the developing world in the 1940s and 
1950s (Orr 1990: 104). Japan used aid as an important instrument in the re-establishment of her trade and 
investment in the 1950s and 1960s (Hasegawa 1975: 3; Ozawa 1989: 95; Koppel and Orr 1993: 353; Rix 
1993: 18; Tisch and Wallace 1994: 6; and MOFA 2001).2 However, as mentioned earlier, in an attempt to 
respond to international criticism and also due to many global-level initiatives including the Millennium 
Development Goals, rich countries (including Japan) have pledged to increase assistance to poor regions 
of the world and also have changed their aid policies to certain extent. 
Currently, almost all donors mention humanitarian assistance in explaining their aid motives. Japan is 
formulating a new ODA charter and has indicated in its draft that she seeks a greater role in promoting 
economic development in developing countries. It is also said that the new draft is significantly different 
from the old charter enacted in 1992. Whatever the policies mentioned in documents, however, donors’ 
motives are sometimes doubted. Japanese aid allocation is not free of criticism and it is argued that Japan’s 
aid policy is simply a continuation of her domestic post-war economic recovery strategy; that is, concern 
for her domestic prosperity and security.  
Whatever the reasons given above, Japan remains as one of the largest donor countries in the world 
(see Table 1.1), making ODA contributions to more than 150 developing countries. She provided a peak 
of $15.3 billion in foreign assistance in 1999 (0.35 per cent of GNP), perhaps the highest amount among 
all the industrial countries (Yamashita and Khachi 2003: 1). This is above the average of 0.29 per cent for 
all industrial countries, though it is well below the internationally agreed United Nations target of 0.7 per 
cent. Due to the prolonged economic slump however, the ODA budget was slashed by 9.4 per cent in 
2003 following an 11.9 per cent drop in 2002. But it is important to look at how Japanese aid policies have 
                                                 
1   The Monterrey Consensus too acknowledged the need for increased assistance by developed countries and 
urges them to make concerted effort to maintain or reach the aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP set in 1970 by 
the United Nations. 
2   The Final Report of the Second Consultative Committee on ODA Reform of Japanese Government is 
available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/report0203.html (accessed 20 December 2002). 
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changed over time and what factors really determine the allocation of Japanese funds given its huge aid 
package. To the authors’ knowledge, there are few studies available on the determinants of Japanese aid 
allocation using a long sample period with cross country data. We hope this empirical study will provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the determinants of aid allocation behaviour of Japan. The study will 
also shed light on some possible future scenarios.  
 
Table 1.1 Japanese net ODA compared with other donor countries 
  1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000 2001 2002 
0.226 1.229 5.250 11.176 13.508 9.847 9.283 
Japan (0.22) (0.22) (0.30) (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) 
0.116 0.399 0.798 1.034 0.987 0.873 0.989 
Australia (0.43) (0.44) (0.40) (0.30) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) 
0.088 0.323 0.557 0.848 0.820 0.867 1.071 
Belgium (0.56) (0.52) (0.51) (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.42) 
0.120 0.730 1.639 2.156 1.744 1.533 2.006 
Canada (0.14) (0.46) (0.45) (0.38) (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) 
0.845 1.343 3.853 7.278 4.105 4.198 5.486 
France (0.91) (0.43) (0.55) (0.53) (0.31) 0.32 0.39 
0.436 1.541 3.670 6.664 5.030 4.989 5.324 
Germany - (0.28) (0.38) (0.32) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
0.090 0.210 1.705 2.560 1.376 1.627 2.332 
Italy (0.14) (0.11) (0.28) (0.23) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) 
0.079 0.627 1.637 2.844 3.135 3.172 3.338 
Netherlands (0.37) (0.65) (0.92) (0.79) (0.84) (0.83) (0.80) 
0.453 0.974 1.925 3.232 4.501 4.579 4.924 United 
Kingdom - (0.38) (0.34) (0.28) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) 
3.464 4.010 8.381 9.597 9.955 11.429 13.290 United 
States (0.50) (0.25) (0.21) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) 
 
Source: OECD Statistics Online3 and World Development Indicators. Note: Net ODA figures are in billion US 
dollar. Net ODA figure as percentage of GNP is given in parentheses.  
 
The objectives  of this  paper are:  (1)  to explain  how Japanese  aid allocation policies changed over time;  
(2) to identify major determinants of Japanese bilateral aid allocation; and (3) to evaluate the stated 
objectives mentioned in various aid policy documents versus their actual achievements, and prospects for 
increased aid towards most aid-needy countries. The paper is organised as follows. Following this 
introduction, Section 2 raises the issue of the future of Japanese ODA allocation in light of past trends 
and motivations. Section 3 furnishes a review of the existing literature on aid allocation, whilst Section 4 
presents the specifications of the econometric model estimation. The interpretations of the results are 
made available in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3  www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
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2. An evaluation of changes in Japanese aid policies over time 
This section briefly reviews the evolution of Japan’s aid policy, its relative size and regional distribution in 
light of past trends and motivation.  
 
2.1 Early stage of Japanese aid: 1950s and 1960s 
Japan commenced her development assistance programmes through technical assistance in 1954, just after 
joining the Colombo Plan.4 Japan joined the Colombo Plan on 6 October 1954 with a contribution of 
$50,000, while still receiving economic assistance from the World Bank and the US.5 It was as a member 
of this organisation that Japan initiated its foreign assistance programme (Ratnayaka 2003). In 1958, the 
first ODA loan of Yen18 billion was extended to India, and grant aid and food aid started in 1968. At its 
inception, Japanese aid started from her post-war economic recovery strategy by war reparation 
negotiations or economic cooperation with the Asian nations Japan had occupied during World War II. In 
1954, the Japan-Burma Peace Treaty and Agreement on Reparations and Economic Cooperation was 
signed. In 1955, a reparations department was established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its Asian 
Affairs Bureau. Reparations agreements were signed between Japan and Philippines in 1956 and between 
Japan and Indonesia in 1958. An agreement was also signed with Thailand, and later special aid packages 
were extended to Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia. Japanese aid in the 1950s was heavily linked with her 
economic benefits: expansion of the export market, assurance of the inflow of raw materials for 
expanding domestic companies, and supporting the participation of Japanese companies in many Asian 
countries. Though the sum of reparation expenditure was only about $1 billion over 20 years, it 
contributed significantly to the pursuit of her economic interest (Brooks and Orr 1985: 324). At the same 
time the arrangements helped Southeast Asian countries to increase their capacity and to accelerate their 
economic development. So, the aid policy of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s can be seen simply from her 
economic interest in the post-war period and not from Japan’s overall foreign policy or the inherent aid 
philosophy that came to prominence in the 1970s. Table 2.1 shows the historical evolution of Japanese aid 
plans and their main targets. 
 
2.2 Japanese aid in the 1970s and 1980s 
By 1978, Japan appeared as a major bilateral donor in Asia and by the year 1989, Japan emerged as the 
number one donor in the world with a net disbursement of $8.965 billion (Association for Promotion of 
International Cooperation 1991: 61). Since then, with the natural ups or downs of her position among 
development assistance committee (DAC) countries, Japan has maintained her position as a leading donor 
in the world. Of the policy changes during the period under review in this study, the first policy change 
came in the early 1970s, when Japan had to revise her foreign policy because of various international 
                                                 
4   The Colombo Plan was launched in 1951 and takes its name from Sri Lanka’s capital where the plan was 
formulated and established (Arnold 1996). 
5   Japan received a total of $862.9 million from the World Bank to finance its 31 projects in 13 years (from 1952 
to 1966) and it became the 11th country to graduate in November 1966.  
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crises. The first was the oil embargo by Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 
which severely affected Japan. The oil crisis stimulated Japan to redesign her foreign policy to secure a 
steady supply of energy and other resources during this period. Aid was utilised as an essential instrument 
to protect diplomatic interests with resource-rich countries outside of Asia. In addition, Japan had to 
balance between the resource-rich Middle East countries, and Israel and her Western alliance. The oil 
crisis also resulted in Japan’s globalisation of her aid allocation and expansion into new regions such as 
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The initial share for the new regions accounted for about one 
third of Japan’s total aid. 
 
Table 2.1 ODA plans of Japan and their main features 
Plan Period Main features/targets 
First Plan 1978-1980 To double the annual amount of ODA from $1.4 billion per year 
to $2.8 billion per year at the end of the period. 
Second Plan 1981-1985 To double the 5 year total amount of ODA from $10.7 billion to 
$21.4 billion at the end of the period. 
Third Plan 1986-1992 To double the annual amount of ODA from $3.8 billion per year 
to $7.6 billion per year at the end of the period. 
Fourth Plan 1988-1992 To double the 5 year total amount of ODA from $25 billion per 
year to $50 billion per year at the end of the period. 
Fifth Plan 1993-1997 To increase the 5 year total amount of ODA from $70 billion to 
$75 billion at the end of the period and also increase grant 
components and untied projects. 
Sixth Plan 1999-2004 ODA has been more streamlined and objective based. Has 
encouraged more NGO participation. 
 
Source: Adapted from Yamashita and Khachi (2003). 
 
Apart from the oil crisis other factors that affected general foreign policy as well as aid policy in the 1970s 
were the relationship with the US, pressure from the international community (especially from the US and 
other DAC countries) to increase the aid budget, and her image question in the global environment. Japan 
became conscious that she would have to give more weight to the US-Japan relationship because of 
political and security reasons as well as for the expansion of her international economic activities. 
Insecurity on the Korean peninsula, instability in China, and the intentions of the Soviet Union in Asia 
became increasing security concerns for the country (Koppel and Orr 1993: 342). Moreover Japan’s trade 
with the US continued to increase. What the US sought from Japan was her participation in a share of the 
global security objectives of the western alliance. Given this situation, Japan began to define her aid 
programme with broadly defined political and security objectives paving the way for aid to enter into the 
foreign policy framework of Japan. 
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Having the experience of difficult aid management in the 1970s, aid later developed into a multi-
dimensional and multi-purpose diplomatic instrument in the 1980s. Despite the lion’s share of aid 
disbursed in Asia,6 Japanese aid eventually began to acquire a global focus, enhancing Japan’s relations 
with rest of the world. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) wanted to use ODA to 
restructure Japan’s FDI and trade relations with Southeast Asia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 
on the other hand, was more likely to use aid as a diplomatic lever. As a result both commercial and 
strategic perspectives dominated the aid flow of Japan in the 1980s. 
ODA policy-making was a bit challenging in the latter half of the 1980s. Aid became the subject of 
evaluation in both domestic and international platforms. The Western alliance accused Japan of not 
keeping up to her promises of ODA, and of failing to meet DAC standards in terms of concessionality. 
Domestic critics from the media, universities, grass-roots organisations and opposition parties, focused on 
the waste and corruption of Japanese ODA. More challenges for the ODA policy came after the Plaza 
Accord in September 1985. The outcome of the Plaza accord was the recognition of Japan as an economic 
superpower. Firstly, the Plaza accord increased the expectations substantially about Japan’s global role as 
the largest creditor nation. Secondly, it forced Japan to respond quickly with her own economic security 
and competitiveness strategies in the changing economic polarisation. The Plaza accord can be considered 
as a milestone for Japan because it is at this point that the country regained her confidence as a great 
economic power and began to define her role heading into the twenty-first century.  
After the Plaza Accord in 1985, coping with increased international economic competitiveness 
became a key issue for Japan. The appreciation of the yen made certain manufacturing sectors 
uncompetitive and allowed the country to move her manufacturing overseas. Japan explored to find 
profitable investment opportunities abroad. Asian countries, especially those in Southeast Asia, emerged 
as natural candidates due to superior locational advantage for Japan’s FDI. Since 1985, Japan’s FDI in 
Asian manufacturing grew quickly from about $500 million a year to over $3 billion a year (Arase 1995: 
142). Japanese ODA began to be used as a way to build infrastructure, to improve domestic skills, and to 
create institutions in her Asian neighbours, ensuring less risky flows of Japanese capital. Undoubtedly, 
Japan’s effort was successful and both of the parties benefited. Japan could face her economic challenges 
and Southeast Asian countries could experience a higher growth path. This success story led Japan to 
formulate her own style of development cooperation – support industrial development and economic 
integration of developing countries (Ohno 2003: 30–41). 
In the second half of the 1980s the power of the socialist block was on track to weaken with 
significant implications for Japan’s ODA policy: one such implication related to Japan’s contribution to 
Western security. During the Cold War era there was pressure from the Western alliance, especially from 
the US, to allocate more aid to the countries facing a Soviet threat. As security threats disappeared, the 
                                                 
6   Japan’s aid concentration to Asia was almost 100 per cent in the 1960s and very first years of the 1970s. In 
1971, 98.4 per cent of Japanese aid went to Asia. However, the percentage declined gradually in the later years 
of the decade and by the late 1970s the percentage stabilised between 65 to 70 per cent. In the early 1980s the 
Foreign Ministry unofficially instituted a policy of maintaining 70-10-10-10 ratio, which means 70 per cent to 
Asia and 10 per cent each for Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, respectively. 
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transition economies in Asia became a more feasible region for Japan’s foreign assistance and private 
capital flow because of continued market-oriented reform in those economies.  
 
2.3 Japanese aid in the 1990s  
During the 1990s, transitional economies in Asia such as Laos, Vietnam and Mongolia emerged as key 
recipient nations as Japan’s overall economic and political interest, and ODA flow to these countries 
increased substantially in the period. In addition, after the break-up of the former Soviet Union in 1991, 
previously socialist countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe became included on the ODA recipient 
list for the reconstruction of the countries in order to hold Japan’s image and interest in the changing 
environment. Given the changing global socio-economic, political and environmental situation together 
with the collapse of the Cold War, Japan enacted a new ODA charter in 1992. As a result, Japan’s ODA 
has become more streamlined and objective-based in the last decade than ever before.  
 
2.4 Japanese aid – present and future 
At the time of writing the government of Japan is revising its decade-old ODA charter in response to the 
global changes induced by the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Millennium Development Goals adopted 
by the United Nations, and increasing calls for Japan to have more transparent and greater diversity in 
ODA programmes. It has been asserted in the discussion above that Japanese bilateral aid allocation has 
two goals. The first goal has been survival and prosperity, reflecting the economic aspect of its aid policy. 
This is what some writers have described as “economic nationalism” (Hasegawa 1975: 3; Ozawa, 1989: 95; 
and Tisch and Wallace 1994, 6).7  
The second goal has been to acquire and maintain the social and political trust of the world 
community. Japan has presented the rationale for its foreign assistance programme in terms of five main 
factors: perceived international obligation (1) as a rich nation, (2) as the world’s greatest creditor nation, 
(3) as a  country economically  dependent on less  developed countries,  (4)  as a peace-loving  nation  and 
(5) as the only advanced non-western nation (Rix 1993: 14). As one of the largest donor countries in the 
world, Japan has made ODA contributions to more than 150 developing countries. Table 1.1 reveals the 
comparative picture of Japanese aid. 
 
2.5 Will Japan in the light of the MDGs allocate more aid to the most aid needy 
regions? 
The donors are obliged as they have committed to increasing aid to help achieve the poverty reduction 
goal in the MDGs. The Sub-Saharan Africa region, being the neediest in the world deserves more aid than  
                                                 
7   Hasegawa divided objectives of the Japanese aid programme as falling into five groups: (1) Japanese 
nationalism, (2) non-ideological economic expansionism, (3) ideological expansionism, (4) self-preservation, 
and (5) world communalism.  
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the other regions.8 Given this background an attempt is made in this section to revive the regional 
distribution of Japanese aid. It was the second diplomacy report – produced as far back as 1958 – which 
emphasised the importance of economic prosperity of Asia as a necessary condition for the political and 
economic stability of Japan itself. Hence the favoured position held by Asia in the distribution of Japanese 
assistance. This distribution scheme remains unchanged to-date given the highly diverse conditions in 
Asian developing countries in terms of income levels, growth rates and social and environmental 
conditions (Cooray 2003). Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the transition economies in 
Central Asia were also added to the number of Asian countries receiving Japanese assistance. 
Table 2.2 presents details of the geographical distribution of Japanese ODA. From the table we can 
note that Japanese aid to Asia is unequally distributed by country and region. Southeast Asia, whose per 
capita incomes are comparatively higher, receives 32.7 per cent of the total as compared to the 11.7 per 
cent received by the so-called Southwest Asia.9 In the geographical distribution of Japanese ODA, Africa 
ranks second as a recipient world region with Latin America and the Caribbean occupying the third 
position. Africa received 10.1 per cent of Japanese ODA in 2000 and Latin America 8.3 per cent. 
According to Table 2.2 absolute aid figures for Africa – the neediest region in the world in terms of 
poverty – had been gradually increasing until 1999. Decrease in 2000 and the later period can be justified 
by general slowdown of Japanese aid. By looking at the historical record, one can argue that Japan has 
helped the neediest region, but not as much as the better-off Asian region. How is Japan’s aid allocation 
according to recipient needs, when compared with other donors? 
It is worth citing in this regard an interesting study by Baulch (2004a and 2004b), who constructed a 
Suits index for major bilateral and multilateral donors, and assessed donors’ contribution to achieving 
MDGs.10 Negative values for Suits index of Table 2.3 relating to the United Nations, World Bank, the 
Netherlands and UK, reveal that they have distributed a large share of their concessionary aid to the 
poorest and most deprived countries/regions. Japan occupies an intermediate position in terms of recent 
aid distribution which implies that it contributes to low income countries but also makes considerable 
allocation to relatively well-off countries, as indicated above. In contrast, high positive values of Suits 
index for the US and European Commission suggest that they are less committed to needy regions.  
 
                                                 
8  It is true that there are more poor and deprived people in South Asia. However, we believe that the countries in 
the region, such as India where most of the poor in numerical terms are concentrated, has relatively more 
financial and other human resources to address the problem.  
9  According to Japanese ODA reports Southwest countries include what are normally called South Asian 
countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.   
10   Please see Baulch 2004a and 2004b for explanation of methodology and estimation procedure of Suits index. 
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Table 2.2 Regional distribution of Japanese bilateral aid 
    
1985-
89 
1990-
94 1995-1999 2000 2001 
Asia    3183.2 4913.4 4993.716 5283.82  4220.48  
    (64.04) (58.3) (55.95) (54.81) (56.6) 
  Northeast Asia  616.6 1133.2 1099.658 700.46 694.69 
    (12.41) (13.45) (12.32) (7.2) (9.3) 
  Southeast Asia  1684 2533.2 2444.924 3155.47 2117.52 
    (33.88) (30.06) (27.39) (32.73) (28.4) 
  Southwest Asia  875.2 1229.2 1269.942 1130.07 1156.87 
    (17.61) (14.59) (14.23) (11.72) (15.5) 
  Others 7.4 17.8 179.192 297.82 251.41 
    (0.15) (0.21) (2.01) (3.09) (3.3) 
Middle East    403.6 829.8 546.23 727.46 287.19 
    (8.12) (9.85) (6.12) (7.55) (3.9) 
Africa    622 934.2 1029.526 968.98 851.33 
    (12.51) (11.09) (11.53) (10.05) (11.4) 
Central and South America 384.4 749.6 842.042 799.56 738.21 
    (7.73) (8.89) (9.43) (8.29) (9.9) 
Oceania    67.6 131.2 160.446 151.06 101.5 
    (1.36) (1.56) (1.8) (1.57) (1.4) 
Europe    4 106.8 156.424 117.57 116.1 
    (0.08) (1.27) (1.75) (1.22) (1.6) 
Unallocated/unspecified   305.6 763.4 1197.726 1591.64 1137.22 
    (6.15) (9.06) (13.42) (16.51) (15.3) 
Total   4970.4 8427.6 8925.91 9640.09 7452.04 
    (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
 
Source: Compiled by authors from various Japanese ODA Annual Reports.  
Note: Percentage is given in parenthesis. Net disbursement is in million dollars.  
 
Table 2.3 Suits indices for the major bilateral and multilateral donors 
USA 0.370 0.416 0.422 0.457 
Japan 0.218 0.299 0.320 0.370 
European Commission 0.308 0.345 0.361 0.390 
World Bank(IDA) -0.386 -0.309 -0.247 -0.176 
France 0.191 0.257 0.257 0.290 
Germany 0.155 0.212 0.234 0.275 
United Nations -0.013 0.041 0.082 0.130 
UK -0.324 -0.256 -0.201 -0.138 
Netherlands -0.165 -0.095 -0.060 -0.004 
DAC, Total 0.125 0.187 0.208 0.254 
 
Source: Baulch (2004b: 8). 
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3. Review of literature on aid allocation 
Having discussed the policies of Japanese aid and its regional distribution, we present in this section a 
review of literature on determinants of aid allocation of other donor countries. Research on bilateral aid 
allocation behaviour started in the mid-1950s. Since then several studies have been done on aid allocation 
decisions of various bilateral donors, mostly on the United States and other Western donors. However, 
the use of econometric modelling to describe the decision of aid allocation began in the late 1970s. The 
most pioneering and widely cited empirical works include those of McKinlay and Little (1977, 1979), and 
McKinlay (1978). They estimated two different equations with different variables representing both the 
recipient-need and donor-interest (RN-DI) aspects in aid allocation pattern of major donors. However, in 
recent years criticisms have emerged regarding the specification of the RN-DI model (McGillivray 2003). 
McKinlay and Little (1977, 1979) analysed US aid allocation behaviour over the period 1960 to 1970. The 
results revealed that humanitarian criteria did not cause and explain US aid allocation, whereas security 
and political reasons were found to be highly significant in the US aid allocation choice. 
Maizels and Nissanke (1984), with cross-country data, attempted to identify the underlying principles 
of aid allocation using recipient need and donor interest for the period 1969/70 to 1978/80. The study 
examined bilateral and multilateral aid from principal donors such as the US, France, Germany, Japan and 
the UK. Results found that bilateral aid flows are heavily determined by donor interest whereas 
multilateral aid allocations are made available according to recipient needs. 
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) found that the UK favours its former colonies (currently known 
as Commonwealth Countries) in their bilateral aid allocation. The result was also consistent with 
humanitarian interests. 
Shishido and Minato (1994: 110) studied the ODA behaviour of the G7 countries at both aggregate 
and bilateral levels. According to the study ‘many differences were observed in their behaviour in terms of 
international security, conflicts between policy targets, neutrality, humanitarianism, trade linkage, etc., at 
both the aggregate and bilateral allocation levels in the ODA flow’. The countries, according to the study, 
that show a growing dynamism in their ODA behaviour are Japan, Germany, France, and Italy.  
Gounder (1994) tested the recipient need and donor interest hypotheses by taking Australia’s bilateral 
aid programmes into consideration. In contrast to the findings of other studies, both donor interest and 
recipient need models are supported in the case of Australia’s bilateral aid allocation. Again, Gounder and 
Sen (1999) studied the behaviour of Australian aid to Indonesia using the data from 1970/71 to 1995/96. 
Two regression models, namely RN and DI models, were employed. The results revealed that both RN 
and DI models explain Australia’s aid to Indonesia, in general, but the RN model dominates the DI 
model. 
Arvin and Drewes (2001: 176) focused on the issues of population and middle-income biases in 
German aid allocation. The sample study of 85 recipient countries for the period 1973–1995 found 
evidence of population bias but no middle-income bias in German aid allocation. Berthelemy and Tichit 
(2002: 26) studied the aid allocation behaviour of the 22 donors of the Development Assistance 
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Committee of the OECD for 20 years (1980–99) and 137 recipient countries. The authors utilised a Tobit 
model in their study and found that aid is generally increasing for most donors in the 1990s and good 
economic and political environments have been rewarded by donors since 1990. 
McGillivray (2003: 5) pointed out that estimations of two separate equations provides biased results 
as both recipient needs and donor interests influence aid allocation in a different way. As all of the donor-
interest and recipient-need variables have an effect on aid allocation, it is necessary to introduce them 
altogether in one equation. He also studied the reliability of the RN-DI studies by using rigorous 
econometric methods and found that, as opposed to the previous findings in RN-DN studies, 
development criteria, in fact, affected the US aid allocation assessment during the cold war period. Table 
3.1 shows the summary of major studies on aid allocation together with their main features. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of major studies on bilateral ODA allocation 
Author (date) 
and sample 
period (SP) 
Donor Explanatory variables Main Findings 
McKinlay and 
Little (1977 and 
1979) 
Sample period: 
1960–70 
US Recipient need: GDP per capita, per capita 
calorie consumption, number of doctors per 
100,000 population, size of international 
liquidity, growth rate of real per capita GDP, and 
gross domestic fixed capital formation. 
Donor interest: development interests, overseas 
economic interests, security interests, power 
political interests, and political stability and 
democracy interest variables. 
 
Foreign policy view 
clearly dominated. 
Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) 
Sample period: 
1969–70 and 
1978–80 
US,  French, 
German, 
Japanese, 
British, 
multilateral 
aid flow 
Recipient need: population, GNP per capita, 
PQLI, GNP growth rate, balance of payments 
Donor interest: political and security interests, 
investment interests, and trade interests 
variables. 
Donor interest model 
provides good 
explanation for 
bilateral aid, whereas 
recipient need model 
fits multilateral flow. 
 
Mark McGillivray 
and Edward 
Oczkowski 
(1992) 
Sample period: 
1980–87 
Britain GNP per capita, population, dummy variable for 
least developed countries, newly industrialised 
country dummy. 
British bilateral aid 
eligibility and amount 
decisions are related to 
her humanitarian, 
commercial, and 
political interests in 
developing countries. 
 
Gounder (1994) 
Sample period: 
1985–92 
Australia Recipient need: per capita living levels, growth 
rate of per capita, deficit of the balance of 
payments, population 
Both recipient need 
and donor interest 
models provide good 
explanation of 
Australia’s bilateral aid. 
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Shishido and 
Minato (1994) 
Sample period: 
1970–89 
G7 
countries: 
Japan, US, 
Canada, UK, 
France, 
Germany, 
and Italy 
Aggregate ODA: nominal GDP, current account 
balance, exchange rate, defence expenditure, 
social security expenditure. 
Bilateral ODA: population, per capita GNP, share 
of primary imports, manufacturing exports. 
Many differences were 
observed in the 
behaviour of donors. 
Japan, Germany, 
France, and Italy show 
growing dynamism in 
their ODA behaviour. 
 
Gounder and 
Sen (1999) 
Australia Recipient need: per capita GNP, deficit on the 
balance of payments, population, time lag of per 
capita aid 
Donor interest: per capita military aid, Australia’s 
investment to Indonesia, Australia’s export to 
Indonesia. 
 
Recipient need model 
dominates the donor 
interest model. 
Arvin and 
Drewes (2001) 
Sample period: 
1973–95 
German GNP per capita, population, import of the 
recipient from Germany, privileged group, and 
country dummy 
Existence of a 
population bias, but no 
evidence of a middle 
income bias. 
 
Berthelemy and  
Tichit (2002) 
Sample period: 
1980–99 
22 donors of 
the DAC of 
OECD 
Real GDP per capita, population, growth rate, 
FDI, primary enrolment rate, infant mortality, 
total aid commitment of other donors, civil 
liberty and political freedom, bilateral trade flow, 
dummy variables: former colony, when the 
recipient is Egypt and donor is USA. 
Donors reward good 
economic policy 
outcomes since 1990. 
The end of the Cold 
War has reduced the 
bias towards former 
colonial links. 
 
Neumayer 
(2003)  
Sample period: 
1983–97 
Four regional 
development 
banks and 
three United 
Nations 
agencies. 
Population, GDP per capita, political freedom, 
integrity rights, military expenditures, arms 
imports, PQLI, corruption, colony dummy. 
Most regional 
development banks 
focus exclusively on 
economic need of the 
recipient. UN agencies 
take account the 
human development 
aspects. 
McGillivary 
(2003) 
US GNP per capita, population, infant morality rate, 
income growth, US export to recipient country, 
US arms transfer to the recipient, and special 
relation dummy. 
 
Development criteria 
have had a larger 
influence during the 
Cold War period than 
previously thought. 
 
Source: Cooray and Shahiduzzaman (2004). 
 
4. The model specification, data and estimation 
As evident, in Section 2 on Japanese aid policy and Section 3 on the literature survey of aid allocation, 
donors have underlying factors which affect their aid allocation decisions. Existing literature classifies 
them into donor-interest and recipient-need. Recently, policy performance variables have been included in 
aid allocation studies as a third group of variables. Donor-interest explains the economic, political, and 
strategic interests of the donor while recipient-need explains the economic, social, and human 
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development needs of the recipient countries. As shown in the literature review, there is little doubt that 
donor interest variables play dominant roles in aid allocation although donor’s various policy documents 
explain recipient need criteria as a main factor in allocating aid. For example, the basic doctrines of Japan’s 
ODA Charter of 1992 are those of humanitarian considerations and to support recipients in self-help 
efforts. If aid is allocated on the basis of recipient needs, then the poorest countries should receive more aid than their richest 
counterparts. A number of studies find that donors give more aid to poor countries. Some studies include 
human development aspects to explain recipient need. Following Burnside and Dollar’s (2000; 1998) 
conclusions that aid works only in a good policy environment, bilateral and multilateral donors are now 
becoming concerned with the policy environment of recipient countries. Recent aid allocation studies 
accordingly include some policy performance variables. 
Following McGillivray (2003) criticism of the 2 separate equation model, in the current study we put 
all Recipient Need (RN), Donor Interest (DI) and policy performance variables together so this approach 
can escape the criticism of the omitted variable problem. The model is estimated using panel data for 
recipient countries. All explanatory variables are in one year lag. This is due to the fact that aid decisions 
are made just prior to or at the commencement of a year. At that time, the data available to decision 
makers is mostly for the previous year. We choose aid commitment rather than the disbursement as the 
dependent variable. Here, commitment should be viewed as the decision to supply aid. There is 
controversy in existing literatures about the use of endogenous variable in per capita or absolute terms 
(McGillivary and Oczkowski 1992: 1314). Calculating per capita aid allocations, from a pool of 
predetermined funds, may be a difficult and cumbersome procedure as donors and aid agencies rarely 
report aid in per capita terms. The fact is that aid is allocated in absolute terms from a large amount of 
pooled funds. Absolute aid allocation is the final decision which may be already adjusted for the 
population of the recipient country, if donors deem it important. The variables ODA, population, per 
capita GDP, distance, export from Japan and import to Japan are employed in natural log as they vary 
across a large range among recipients. Population and GDP per capita are also employed in the quadratic 
form to allow for non-linearity in their relationship with the aid variable. The general form of the 
regression equation is as follows: 
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Where, ODA is the bilateral ODA commitment, GDP is real GDP per capita of the recipient country, 
POP is Population of the recipient country, EXP_J is export from Japan to recipient country, and IMP_J 
is the import to Japan from recipient country. Freedom is an index of democracy indicating civil liberty 
and political right of the recipient country. DIST is the distance from Tokyo to the capital city of the 
recipient country. IMR is the infant mortality rate while OPEN is the openness index of the recipient 
country. 
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4.1 Data and sources 
The sample included in this study covers about 96 Japanese aid recipient countries/territories for the 
period of 1981–2001. Every attempt has been made to contain as many recipient countries as possible. 
Sample size is affected by the availability of data of the explanatory variables. Data for all variables are 
taken on a yearly basis. ODA is the bilateral ODA commitments by purpose of the Japanese Government 
taken from the Geographical Distribution of Financial Flow of Source OECD online database. The 
nominal ODA flow has been converted to real using 1995 constant dollars by using the deflator for 
resource flow from DAC members. Real GDP per capita at constant 1995 dollars is taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) online database. POP is the Population of the recipient country, also 
collected from WDI. EXP_J and IMP_J are the constant 1995 exports and imports from and to Japan 
respectively collected from Source OECD. Nominal export and import data are collected from Direction 
of Trade (DOT) online database and again it is converted into real figures by using the deflator. The 
distance (DIST) from Tokyo to the capital city of the recipient country is collected from Meridian world 
database. Index for freedom of democracy is an un-weighted sum of political right and civil liberty indexes 
taken from Freedom House’s Freedom of the World survey. The survey evaluates political rights and civil 
liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. Infant 
mortality rate is included in this study as an indicator of the performance of social policies in the recipient 
country. The data is collected from the WDI online of the World Bank. However because of the large 
number of missing observations in the data series it has been necessary to estimate missing values from 
the data set. When we do not have any a priori information, the most common approach is to replace the 
missing observation with the sample mean of observations. OPEN is the ratio of the sum of the export 
and import to GDP of the recipient country. Export, import and GDP data are collected from the WDI 
online of the World Bank.  
 
5. Estimated results  
The estimation results are given in the Table 5.1. Because the absolute amount of aid varies in large extent 
among the recipient countries, it is suspected that heteroscedasticity is present in the data. For this reason, 
a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) in Cross Section Weights is employed. For each specification an “F” 
test is performed to compare the common intercept and fixed effects estimation. The test statistics reject 
the null hypothesis of a common intercept. In the second stage, a random effects model is run and 
Hausman test statistics are performed for each of the specifications to compare fixed effects and random 
effects. The Hausman test statistics reject the random effects in favour of the fixed effects models. 
However, as the distance variable cannot be estimated in the fixed effects model because of its time-
invariant characteristics, the GLS estimation in common intercept is also reported in Table 5.1 along with 
the fixed effects specifications. The explanatory powers of equations as measured by R2 are quite high 
given the cross sectional nature of the study. The variables such as real GDP per capita, population size, 
exports from Japan to recipient country, imports to Japan from  the recipient countries,  distance,  and the 
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Table 5.1 Estimated equations 
 Common Intercept Fixed Effects 
 Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
GDPPC 3.228*** 
(10.844) 
2.767*** 
(7.287) 
3.205*** 
(3.605) 
2.788** 
(2.526) 
GDPPC2 -0.247*** 
(-12.122) 
-0.219*** 
(-8.081) 
-0.173** 
(-2.543) 
-0.156* 
(-1.856) 
POP 0.617*** 
(15.675) 
0.583*** 
(10.548) 
2.606*** 
(8.574) 
3.192*** 
(6.776) 
POP2 -0.026*** 
(-4.325) 
-0.029*** 
(-4.117) 
-0.267*** 
(-4.591) 
-0.357*** 
(-4.153) 
EXP_J 0.064* 
(1.681) 
0.123*** 
(2.692) 
0.186*** 
(3.602) 
0.187*** 
(2.896) 
IMP_J 0.078*** 
(3.757) 
0.098*** 
(4.1) 
0.059* 
(1.877) 
0.0007 
(0.018) 
DIST  -1.133*** 
(-12.391) 
-0.988*** 
(-8.016) 
  
Freedom -0.114*** 
(-10.766) 
-0.099*** 
(-7.866) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.126) 
-0.026* 
(-1.681) 
IMR 0.0001 
(1.09) 
-0.0007 
(0.457) 
-0.002 
(-0.482) 
-0.004 
(1.039) 
OPEN  0.134 
(1.007) 
 -0.009 
(-0.045) 
Constant  2.108 
(1.583) 
2.25 
(1.217) 
  
No. of obs. 1644 1402 1644 1402 
Adjusted R2 0.782 0.781 0.886 0.883 
 
Dependent variable is total bilateral aid commitment. GLS regression is with yearly data. Figures are rounded.  
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Numbers in the parentheses are t statistics. 
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infant mortality rate variable are entered in all equations because of better data availability. The variable 
OPEN is included to check the number of observations and robustness of the results. As for the DIST 
variables the sign of the coefficients are negative as expected and statistically significant at 1 per cent in 
the common intercept estimations. This illustrates Japan’s bias toward Asian countries. It should be noted 
that Asia concentration is the outcome of overall foreign policy objectives. 
In Table 5.1, the common intercept estimations are qualitatively similar to the fixed effects 
estimations. The absolute aid increases as the GDP per capita increases but decreases after a threshold 
level of GDP per capita is reached. Japan’s ODA thus shows an income bias (or middle income 
concerns). Japan may extend aid before reaching a threshold level. The relationship between GDPPC and 
ODA is high in the equations. As evident from specification 1 in the fixed effects, after the threshold 
level, a 1 per cent increase in GDP per capita would decrease absolute ODA by 0.17 per cent which 
reflects humanitarian consideration of Japan’s ODA allocation.  
The population variable also shows a non-linear relation. The sign condition is positive before a 
threshold level. Population size represents the recipient’s need as the larger the population size the larger 
the need of total aid. Regression results show that at the first stage, as population increases absolute aid 
increases, but after a threshold level of population the relationship is inverse. Before the threshold level, a 
1 per cent increase of population increases absolute ODA by 2.6 per cent but after the threshold level, 1 
per cent increases in population decreases aid by 0.27 per cent.  
The variable EXP_J and IMP_J explain Japan’s commercial and security objectives. The explanation 
of the export variable should be quite clear as Japan uses ODA to extend the market for her products in 
the developing world. However, the import variable explains the security motive, as discussed earlier; the 
oil crisis in the early 1970s stimulated Japan to reshape her foreign policy to secure energy and raw 
material supplies for the domestic economy. In specification 1 of the fixed effects, both export and import 
variables have the expected sign and they are significant. The export variable is significant at 1 per cent 
level and the import variable is at 10 per cent. These empirical results demonstrate Japan’s commercial and 
security motives in allocating aid. 
The parameter for freedom variable is negative as expected and is significant. This means that Japan 
is concerned about the democratic situation of the recipient country when they make aid allocation 
decisions. The variables infant mortality rate and openness index are not significant in any specification.  
 
6. Conclusions   
Japanese aid has declined in the recent past as a reflection of the country’s protracted recession for most 
of the 1990s. The economy is recovering at present, but is facing a large fiscal deficit and growing debt. In 
this context, it is doubtful that Japan’s absolute aid levels will increase significantly in the coming years, 
despite developed countries’ pledges to increase financial assistance to help poor countries meet the MDG 
targets. But can Japan redirect aid to the benefit of the most aid-needy countries to at least partially 
compensate for stagnant overall aid levels?   
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It is clear that Japanese aid policies have changed over time to include humanitarian and 
developmental objectives. However, it is also obvious from both the qualitative analysis of Japan’s aid 
policies in the past and our econometric results that Japan takes mainly her own national interests in 
allocating their aid. The econometric results in particular show that Japanese aid exhibits certain bias 
towards middle-income countries, and that commercial interests reflected in a highly significant export 
coefficient play a major role in how aid is allocated. At the same time, the infant mortality variable, which 
is a key one in capturing concerns with social policies in recipient countries, is shown to be non-
significant.  
The nature of Asian bias also may continue in the years to come given Japan’s considerable trade and 
investment links with other Asian countries. Allocation of aid in this way more or less reflects recycling of 
the Japanese surplus created from large external trade and investment. Given the historical trends, one can 
conclude that these determinant factors may continue to play a vital role in future aid allocation decision-
making.  
In light of the above, the prospects of a significant increase in Japanese aid towards the most aid-
needy countries, concentrated mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, look unpromising. There is a need therefore 
for Japan to truly break with the past to be able to effectively contribute to the MDGs through increased 
financial assistance, targeted to poor countries outside Asia. 
 
 17 
References 
Alesina, A. and Dollar, D., 1998, ‘Who gives foreign AID to whom and why’, NBER Working Paper 6612 
Arase, D., 1995, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid, London: Lynne Rienner 
Arnold, G., 1996, Historical Dictionary of Aid and Development Organisation, Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow 
Press: 35 
Arvin, M.B. and Drewes, T., 2001, ‘Are there biases in German bilateral aid allocations’, Applied Economics 
Letters, 8: 173–7 
Association for Promotion of International Cooperation, 1991, Japan’s Official Development Assistance Annual 
Report 1991, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Baulch, B., 2004a, ‘Aid for the poorest? The distribution and maldistribution of international development 
assistance’, CPRC Working Paper 35, Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC): 1–20 
—— 2004b, ‘Aid distribution and the MDGs’, CPRC Working Paper 48, Manchester: Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre (CPRC): 1–25 
Berthelemy, J.-C. and Tichit, A., 2002, ‘Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions: a three-dimensional panel 
analysis’, World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Discussion Paper 2002/123, 
Helsinki: WIDER 
Brooks, W.L. and Orr, R.M. Jr., 1985, ‘Japanese foreign economic assistance’, Asian Survey, Vol 25 No 3: 
322–40 
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D., 2000, ‘Aid, policies and growth’, American Economic Review, Vol 90 No 4: 847–
68 
—— 1998, Aid, The Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction, Macroeconomics and Growth Group, 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Collier, P. and Dollar, D., 1999, Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction, Development Research Group, 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Cooray, N.S., 2003, ‘Japanese Overseas Development Assistance to Sri Lanka and Its Effects’, in W.D. 
Lakshman (ed.), The Distant Neighbours: Fifty Years of Japan-Sri Lanka Relations, University of Colombo, 
Colombo: 222–46 
Cooray, N.S. and Md. Shahiduzzaman, 2004, ‘Determinants of Japanese aid allocation: an econometric 
analysis’, IUJ Research Institute Working Paper 2004-4: 1–19 
Economic Cooperation Bureau, 2001, Japan’s Official Development Assistance: White Paper 2001, Tokyo: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Gounder, R., 1994, ‘Empirical results of aid motivations: Australia’s bilateral aid program’, World 
Development, Vol 22 No 1: 99–113 
Gounder, R. and Sen, K., 1999, ‘What motivates foreign aid, a case study of Australia’s aid to Indonesia’, 
The Journal of Developing Areas 33: 379–94 
Hasegawa, S., 1975, Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice, New York: Praeger Publishers 
Koppel, B.M. and Orr, R.M. Jr., 1993, Japan’s Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era, Boulder: Westview 
 18 
Maizels, A. and Nissanke, M.K., 1984, ‘Motivations for aid to developing countries’, World Development 12: 
879–900 
McGillivray, M., 2003, ‘Modeling foreign aid allocation: issues, approaches and results’, Discussion Paper 
2003/49, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER 
McGillivray, M. and Oczkowski, E., 1992, ‘A two-part sample selection model of British bilateral foreign 
aid allocation’, Applied Economics 24: 1311–19 
McKinlay, R.D., 1978, ‘The German aid relationship: a test of the recipient need and the donor interest 
models of the distribution of German bilateral aid 1961–70’, European Journal of Political Research 6: 
235–57 
McKinlay, R.D. and Little, R., 1979, ‘The US aid relationship: a test of the recipient need and the donor 
interest models’, Political Studies, Vol XXVII No 2 
—— 1977, ‘A foreign policy model of US bilateral aid allocation’, World Politics, Vol XXX No I 
Neumayer, E., 2003, ‘The determinants of aid allocation by regional multilateral development banks and 
United Nations agencies’, International Studies Quarterly 47: 101–22 
Ohno, K., 2003, East Asian Growth and Japanese Aid Strategy, Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies (GRIPS) Development Forum 
Orr, R.M. Jr., 1990, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, New York: Columbia 
Ozawa, T., 1989, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses for Developing Countries, Paris: Development Centre of OECD 
Ratnayaka, P., 2003, ‘Official Development Assistance from Japan: Donor Motives and Recipient 
Perceptions’, in W.D. Lakshman, The Distant Neighbours: Fifty Years of Japan-Sri Lanka Relations, 
University of Colombo, Colombo: 191–219 
Rix, A., 1993, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, London: Routledge 
Shishido, S. and Naonobu, M., 1994, ‘A comparative study of official development assistance by major 
industrial countries: an econometric analysis’, The Developing Economies, XXXII-1 
Tisch, S.J. and Wallace,B.M., 1994, Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The What, Why, and Who of Foreign 
Aid, Boulder: Westview Press 
Todaro, M.P. and Smith, S.C., 2003, Economic Development, Eighth Edition, Boston: Addison Wesley 
United Nations Development Programme, 2003, Human Development Report 2003, New York: UNDP 
Yamashita, M. and Khachi, A.K., 2003, ‘Vector autoregressive analysis of the validity of the two-gap 
model for nine large recipients of Japan’s ODA’, ESRI Discussion Paper Series 43, Tokyo: Economic 
and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office 
